While global energy consumption is high and rising, conventional fuel sources are becoming increasingly scarce and expensive. Further, emissions resulting from the use of fossil fuels have been linked to global climate change and, within a rising number of countries, are subject to regulation. Consequently, governments, businesses and consumers around the world are seeking products and services to improve energy efficiency.
World marketed energy consumption was 462 quadrillion Btu in 2005. Going forward, global energy consumption is forecast to increase 19% between 2005 and 2015 to 551 quadrillion Btu. Conventional fuels such as oil and other liquid petroleum products, natural gas and coal are the world's leading sources of energy.
Together, these sources are expected to account for approximately 85% of the world's energy in 2010. Even considering the technological advancements and increasing penetration of renewable energy sources, the share of world energy supplied by conventional fuels is expected to remain flat to 2015. As fossil fuels, these resources are finite and current projections indicate that they will be depleted within a relatively short timeframe. Further, use of these fuels results in greenhouse gas emissions, which are linked to global climate change. Together with the fact that power generation using these sources is becoming increasingly expensive, current energy use patterns are unsustainable.
Products and services provided by the information and communications technology (ICT) sector enable energy efficiency and emissions reductions. ICTs can be employed to capture, analyze and respond to vast amounts of data which can lead to optimized energy use within large, energy-reliant sectors such as power, industry and logistics. Additionally, the adoption of ICT products and technologies can reduce energy consumption across sectors by enabling smart buildings, dematerialization and travel substitution. Meanwhile, various innovations and trends occurring within the ICT sector are expected to reduce the energy consumption of ICT products themselves.
The continued development and adoption of more efficient PCs and peripherals, data center servers and cooling technologies, telecommunications devices and infrastructure is expected to improve energy efficiency of products produced within the ICT sector. Globally, these improvements are projected to reduce the in-use energy consumption of ICT products by 895 billion kWh in 2015.
While substantial, the magnitude of these savings is dwarfed by the impact that the use of these enabling ICTs are projected to have across other sectors of human enterprise. The global energy savings enabled by ICTs in the power, industrial, and logistics sectors as well as through the cross-sectoral impact of enabling energy efficient buildings, travel substitution and dematerialization are estimated to exceed 6,463 billion kWh in 2015.
The overall global energy savings due to the improved energy efficiency of ICT products themselves as well as the efficiency enabling impact of these products across other energy intensive sectors and activities is therefore projected to grow from 2,618 billion kWh in 2010, to 7,358 billion kWh in 2015. These energy savings equate to 4.5% of projected global energy consumption in 2015.
Along with the reduction in global energy consumption, ICT products are also expected to enable significant reductions in global emissions. The global emissions reductions enabled by energy-smart ICT solutions are projected to grow from 1,393 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2010 to 3,892 million tonnes in 2015. This reflects an 8.7% reduction in projected total global carbon emissions at that time.
The global value created through energy efficiency gains enabled by energy-smart ICT products and solutions across all sectors is projected to grow from $170 billion in 2010 to over $478 billion in 2015. Concurrently, the global value created through the potential monetization of emissions reductions is expected to reach $70 billion by 2015.
In the aggregate, the global value created through the energy and emissions savings estimated at $195 billion in 2010 and is expected to grow to $548 billion by 2015. This substantial value creation represents the impact of incremental adoption of energy-smart ICT products and solutions across several energy intensive sectors that are improving their energy efficiency relative to a 2005 baseline.
ICT Energy Efficiency: Commercial and Industrial includes a broad review of the global market for information and communications technologies which enable conservation of energy. The report examines opportunities for the ICT sector to improve the in-use energy efficiency of its products as well as the ability of the sectors' products to enable energy efficiency across other sectors. Select ICTs which enable energy efficiency are discussed. These ICTs are categorized into 4 sectors: the ICT sector, power sector, logistics sector and industrial sector. Three cross-sector opportunities for efficiency enabling ICTs, buildings, dematerialization and travel substitution, are also discussed.
Report Methodology
The information in ICT Energy Efficiency: Commercial and Industrial is based on primary and secondary research. Primary research entailed interviews with firms involved in the manufacture, distribution and sales of ICT products, analysts and consultants to the energy industry to obtain insight into the products, technologies and market factors shaping the industry. Secondary research entailed data gathering from relevant sources, including government and industry publications, company literature and corporate annual reports.
Posted: Apr 24, 2010 http://www.articlesbase.com/business-opportunities-articles/ict-energy-efficiency-commercial-and-industrial-2220319.html
Showing posts with label MGT 300-INTERNATIONAL ICT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MGT 300-INTERNATIONAL ICT. Show all posts
Thursday, 7 July 2011
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon - A New Source of Cross-Border Tension?
While Hizballah still mulls over its options in the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon-terrorism, political activism, or both-there remains in Lebanon one other sizable community that could be the source of renewed tension and violence: the 350,000 Palestinian refugees. This group has a long and tortured history in Lebanon, but the development of the Oslo process (which most refugees in Lebanon perceive as an illegitimate betrayal of their cause), along with both the loss of Syrian-Lebanese leverage over Israel following unilateral withdrawal and the increasing desperation of the refugees, has fostered those ideological movements inside the refugee camps that may turn violent in order to bring attention to the refugees’ humanitarian plight.
Ideological Landscape
Fatah, traditionally the most dominant group in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, has been attempting to reconsolidate control by installing Arafat loyalists in the leadership of the camps’ Popular Committees. This has been partially successful; in August 1999, Fatah did gain at least partial control over Lebanon’s largest refugee camp, Ein al-Hilweh. Any power Fatah has been able to recoup however, has been partly offset by the gains made in the camps by the various Islamist groups. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and several smaller and more extremist groups aligned with Hizballah have made substantial inroads in refugee support in the camps over the last few years as the political influence of Fatah (and, to some degree, the other secular-leftist groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP]) has diminished.
Secular Rejectionist Groups
These groups are all supported by or under the influence of Damascus; thus it is likely that they will yield to Syrian wishes regarding their operations. They all maintain some infrastructure and support in the Bekaa Valley, and in the past they engaged in terrorist activities both against Israeli targets and in the international arena. The Fatah Rebels, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) are uncompromising toward Israel and the Oslo process. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) opposes accommodation with Israel, although founder Naif Hawatma has petitioned to return to the West Bank. The PFLP is undergoing a leadership transition; founder George Habash’s deputy and putative successor Abu Ali Mustafa returned to the West Bank and expressed a willingness to be incorporated into the Palestinian mainstream, although he also opposes Oslo.
Islamist Groups
Hamas and PIJ are the most active in the refugee camps, although the Lebanese group Hizballah and extremist splinter factions such as Usbat al-Ansar and al-Jamal Islamiya are also active. The vacuum left by the combination of Fatah’s focus on activities in the Palestinian Authority and the decision of the other secular groups to give priority to political over military action has given unprecedented opportunity for the Islamist groups to gain support in the camps. Although in the past Hamas collaboration with Hizballah was limited, lately the two have developed closer ties. This relationship extends from the training of Hamas operatives in Iran to cooperative recruitment efforts in the refugee camps. PIJ, the other major Islamist group, has focused on military operations against Israel, creating opportunities to exploit Hizballah’s resources and facilities in Lebanon.
The fostering of improved relations between Hamas, PIJ, and the Iranians (through Hizballah) has dramatically increased the groups’ penetration of the camps, expanding their influence and their ability to mobilize there. That Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi toured southern Lebanon only two days after the Israeli withdrawal demonstrates that Iran remains determined to boost its involvement with Hizballah as well as its role as patron of the organization’s “victory” over Israel. Although Hizballah may want to keep a low profile on Israel’s northern border for some time, these Palestinian groups can provide a willing and increasingly better-trained proxy to continue the fight. Moreover, these groups can lay claim to a legitimacy Hizballah no longer has: although Israel has withdrawn from Lebanon, the refugees have had no relief for their predicament.
More disturbing than the sheer growth of the Islamist movements in the camps is the growing evidence of their links to terrorist groups outside Lebanon. For example, Usbat al-Ansar, the Islamist splinter group in Ein al-Hilweh with ties to Osama bin Ladin, has been linked to the Jordanian group arrested in December 1999 for terrorist conspiracies and is currently on trial. Usbat al-Ansar was involved in clashes with the Lebanese Armed Forces in January 2000 that occurred concurrently with riots in northern Lebanon pitting other Sunni Islamists against the Lebanese government. Also in the north, Hizb’al-Tahrer al-Islamiya (the Islamic Liberation Party) has escalated its activities in northern Lebanon, especially among Palestinians not living in refugee camps.
Hizballah is furthermore actively exporting its experience to Islamist groups in the West Bank and Gaza. Reportedly, the group recently issued a joint statement with Hamas calling for the “Lebanonization” of the territories-an imperative not only to continue violent activities, but to switch from terrorist to guerilla tactics. In May 2000, the Hamas monthly Falastin al-Muslima made this call explicitly. And the Hamas website reported this quote from the semi-official Palestinian newspaper al-Hayat al-Jadida: “O Lebanese joy, spread your delicious disease among us!”
Policy Imperatives
In his report on Israel’s implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 425, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan hinted at the importance of Palestinian radical organizations when he referred to the roles of both “Lebanese and other armed groups” (emphasis added). Addressing this problem requires the recognition that Hizballah is not the only wild card poised to promote violence among Palestinian groups toward Israeli targets. The refugees also present the Syrians with an opportunity to launch proxy attacks reminding Israel that peace will not come until the Golan Heights are returned to Damascus. Although Syria is the principal conduit of Iranian aid to Hizballah, Damascus also extends support-overflights, landing rights, tacit permission-for Tehran’s outreach to Palestinian Islamist groups. Syrian intentions are therefore central to the maintaining of quiet both on the northern border and within the Palestinian camps themselves. As outside parties like the U.S. government warn Syria it that will be held responsible for ensuring calm on the Israel-Lebanon border, this arrow in Syria’s quiver must be kept in mind.
Apart from an eventual refugee solution contained in a Palestinian-Israeli final status agreement, the lack of adequate arrangements for alleviating the refugees’ plight in Lebanon must be recognized. There is a need for interim policies to forestall violence and stunt the growth of the terrorist cells within the refugee camps. This kind of policy will have to encompass both “sticks” and “carrots.” Specifically, the United States should encourage Lebanon to improve the humanitarian situation of the Palestinian refugees by, for example, loosening restrictions on employment, education, travel, and access to health care. Washington and other parties should also require the Lebanese to provide the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the authority to act decisively against violent groups should it become necessary, relaxing the rules of engagement and giving UNIFIL soldiers jurisdiction to carry out enforcement both in and around the camps and on the border with Israel. This two-pronged approach is in the besinterests of an international community anxious about the potential for renewed violence on the Israel-Lebanon frontier and of the Lebanese government itself, legitimately concerned about the prospect of destabilization on the border and within the refugee camps.
Ideological Landscape
Fatah, traditionally the most dominant group in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, has been attempting to reconsolidate control by installing Arafat loyalists in the leadership of the camps’ Popular Committees. This has been partially successful; in August 1999, Fatah did gain at least partial control over Lebanon’s largest refugee camp, Ein al-Hilweh. Any power Fatah has been able to recoup however, has been partly offset by the gains made in the camps by the various Islamist groups. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and several smaller and more extremist groups aligned with Hizballah have made substantial inroads in refugee support in the camps over the last few years as the political influence of Fatah (and, to some degree, the other secular-leftist groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP]) has diminished.
Secular Rejectionist Groups
These groups are all supported by or under the influence of Damascus; thus it is likely that they will yield to Syrian wishes regarding their operations. They all maintain some infrastructure and support in the Bekaa Valley, and in the past they engaged in terrorist activities both against Israeli targets and in the international arena. The Fatah Rebels, the Abu Nidal Organization, and the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) are uncompromising toward Israel and the Oslo process. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) opposes accommodation with Israel, although founder Naif Hawatma has petitioned to return to the West Bank. The PFLP is undergoing a leadership transition; founder George Habash’s deputy and putative successor Abu Ali Mustafa returned to the West Bank and expressed a willingness to be incorporated into the Palestinian mainstream, although he also opposes Oslo.
Islamist Groups
Hamas and PIJ are the most active in the refugee camps, although the Lebanese group Hizballah and extremist splinter factions such as Usbat al-Ansar and al-Jamal Islamiya are also active. The vacuum left by the combination of Fatah’s focus on activities in the Palestinian Authority and the decision of the other secular groups to give priority to political over military action has given unprecedented opportunity for the Islamist groups to gain support in the camps. Although in the past Hamas collaboration with Hizballah was limited, lately the two have developed closer ties. This relationship extends from the training of Hamas operatives in Iran to cooperative recruitment efforts in the refugee camps. PIJ, the other major Islamist group, has focused on military operations against Israel, creating opportunities to exploit Hizballah’s resources and facilities in Lebanon.
The fostering of improved relations between Hamas, PIJ, and the Iranians (through Hizballah) has dramatically increased the groups’ penetration of the camps, expanding their influence and their ability to mobilize there. That Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi toured southern Lebanon only two days after the Israeli withdrawal demonstrates that Iran remains determined to boost its involvement with Hizballah as well as its role as patron of the organization’s “victory” over Israel. Although Hizballah may want to keep a low profile on Israel’s northern border for some time, these Palestinian groups can provide a willing and increasingly better-trained proxy to continue the fight. Moreover, these groups can lay claim to a legitimacy Hizballah no longer has: although Israel has withdrawn from Lebanon, the refugees have had no relief for their predicament.
More disturbing than the sheer growth of the Islamist movements in the camps is the growing evidence of their links to terrorist groups outside Lebanon. For example, Usbat al-Ansar, the Islamist splinter group in Ein al-Hilweh with ties to Osama bin Ladin, has been linked to the Jordanian group arrested in December 1999 for terrorist conspiracies and is currently on trial. Usbat al-Ansar was involved in clashes with the Lebanese Armed Forces in January 2000 that occurred concurrently with riots in northern Lebanon pitting other Sunni Islamists against the Lebanese government. Also in the north, Hizb’al-Tahrer al-Islamiya (the Islamic Liberation Party) has escalated its activities in northern Lebanon, especially among Palestinians not living in refugee camps.
Hizballah is furthermore actively exporting its experience to Islamist groups in the West Bank and Gaza. Reportedly, the group recently issued a joint statement with Hamas calling for the “Lebanonization” of the territories-an imperative not only to continue violent activities, but to switch from terrorist to guerilla tactics. In May 2000, the Hamas monthly Falastin al-Muslima made this call explicitly. And the Hamas website reported this quote from the semi-official Palestinian newspaper al-Hayat al-Jadida: “O Lebanese joy, spread your delicious disease among us!”
Policy Imperatives
In his report on Israel’s implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 425, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan hinted at the importance of Palestinian radical organizations when he referred to the roles of both “Lebanese and other armed groups” (emphasis added). Addressing this problem requires the recognition that Hizballah is not the only wild card poised to promote violence among Palestinian groups toward Israeli targets. The refugees also present the Syrians with an opportunity to launch proxy attacks reminding Israel that peace will not come until the Golan Heights are returned to Damascus. Although Syria is the principal conduit of Iranian aid to Hizballah, Damascus also extends support-overflights, landing rights, tacit permission-for Tehran’s outreach to Palestinian Islamist groups. Syrian intentions are therefore central to the maintaining of quiet both on the northern border and within the Palestinian camps themselves. As outside parties like the U.S. government warn Syria it that will be held responsible for ensuring calm on the Israel-Lebanon border, this arrow in Syria’s quiver must be kept in mind.
Apart from an eventual refugee solution contained in a Palestinian-Israeli final status agreement, the lack of adequate arrangements for alleviating the refugees’ plight in Lebanon must be recognized. There is a need for interim policies to forestall violence and stunt the growth of the terrorist cells within the refugee camps. This kind of policy will have to encompass both “sticks” and “carrots.” Specifically, the United States should encourage Lebanon to improve the humanitarian situation of the Palestinian refugees by, for example, loosening restrictions on employment, education, travel, and access to health care. Washington and other parties should also require the Lebanese to provide the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the authority to act decisively against violent groups should it become necessary, relaxing the rules of engagement and giving UNIFIL soldiers jurisdiction to carry out enforcement both in and around the camps and on the border with Israel. This two-pronged approach is in the besinterests of an international community anxious about the potential for renewed violence on the Israel-Lebanon frontier and of the Lebanese government itself, legitimately concerned about the prospect of destabilization on the border and within the refugee camps.
| ||
| Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon - A New Source of Cross-Border Tension? | ||
| Nicole Brackman |
Asean launches ICT Masterplan 2015
2011/01/14
By Azlan Abu Bakar
alan@nstp.com.my
By Azlan Abu Bakar
alan@nstp.com.my
KUALA LUMPUR: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) today launched a plan that will harness the potential of information and communication technology (ICT) in the region, to help in establishing an inclusive, vibrant and integrated Asean community.
The Asean ICT Masterplan 2015 is comprehensive and has specific actions and projects with clear targets and timelines in six strategic thrusts to be implemented in the next five years.
"It aims to deliver four key outcomes namely ICT as an engine of growth, recognition of Asean as global ICT hub, enhanced quality of life and contributions towards Asean integration," Information, Communications and Culture Minister Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim said.
Speaking to reporters on the final day of the Asean Telecommunications and IT Ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur today, he said: "We (Asean ministers) welcome and invite all relevant stakeholders and parties to support and actively contribute to the implementation of actions and measures embodies in the masterplan."
Rais said the ministers have tasked their respective senior officials to review the existing ICT cooperation.
These include amongst others the Asean e-commerce database, international mobile data roaming charges and interoperability framework in Asean projects.
"The senior officials will also need to identify available funding sources to come up with the recommendations to ensure timely implementation of the masterplan for consideration at the ministers next meeting," he said.
Using ICT to Increase Impact of Agriculture Sector Development
Judith Payne
United States Agency for International Development
United States Agency for International Development
Date:
May 19, 2011 - 9:00am - 10:30am This seminar was the 59th installment of the Linking Small Firms to Competitiveness Strategies Breakfast Seminar Series sponsored by the USAID Microenterprise Development office.
Information and communications technologies (ICT) are being used in dozens of ways by USAID Feed the Future projects globally. Unfortunately most applications are not sustainable without on-going donor support; have not yet scaled to millions of farmers; and their impact has not yet been well measured.
USAID's Judy Payne provided an overview of some of the most promising ICT interventions that appear to be sustainable and scalable without on-going donor support and also help improve smallholder farmers’ productivity and incomes. Examples included applications that improve access to farm extension and advisory services; ease access to financial services for smallholder farmers; help large buyers better manage and reward 10,000s of producers; provide better market price information; and can help reduce post-harvest losses.
Payne also outlined some good practices related to technical and business models and addressed issues regarding measuring impact of such interventions. She drew upon work conducted under the USAID FACET Project and provided suggestions to help project implementers incorporate issues related to ICT into their value chain analyses.
Strategic, value-based ICT investment as a key factor in bridging the digital divide
- Adeola O. Opesade
- University of Ibadan, ao.opesade@mail.ui.edu.ng
Abstract
The reality of the digital divide—the gap between those who have access to and control of technology and those who do not—means that the introduction and use of information and communication technology (ICT) at different levels of human endeavour would be a challenging undertaking. Failure to meet the challenge would mean a further widening of the knowledge gap and the deepening of existing economic and social inequalities. This paper presents a multi-directional, value-based ICT investment conceptual model that is aimed at assisting developing countries in realizing goal-oriented benefits on their investment in ICT. The model identifies adequate ICT planning at the strategic level, targeted at supporting developmental objectives as a prerequisite for realizing the objective of investment in ICT.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
